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EXECUTIVE POWER: THE SPRINGS OF 
AUTHORITY AND MANDATE RHETORIC 
Kimberley L. Fletcher* 
SAIKRISHNA PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (YALE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2015). PP. 464. HARDCOVER $45.00. 
 
JULIA AZARI, DELIVERING THE PEOPLE’S MESSAGE: THE CHANGING 
POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE (CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2014). PP. 224. HARDCOVER $39.95.  
When the modern president is criticized of wielding executive power without 
first obtaining congressional approval he defends his choice by invoking historical 
precedent, constitutional powers, legislative authority, or an electoral mandate. 
Saikrishna Prakash’s Imperial from the Beginning and Julia Azari’s Delivering the People’s 
Message offer two complimentary theories that seek to elucidate the springs of author-
ity. Prakash asserts the wealth of power enjoyed by the contemporary executive was 
inherent during the founding era when the Constitution was ratified and in the years 
shortly following, paying particular attention to George Washington’s presidency. 
Azari’s book, on the other hand, explores rhetorical mandates, particularly in the 
modern era. Azari offers an insightful illustration of how mandate rhetoric—or the 
use of “the election result, the promises of the campaign, or the wishes of the elec-
torate to justify policy action”1—has buttressed the increasing power of the executive 
over the past century. At the same time, Azari unearths understated shifts in the ex-
ecutive’s relationship to party and ideology. Both Prakash and Azari offer compelling 
historical works that are worthy of thoughtful scholarly consideration and that aid in 
a better understanding of how we might view the prerogatives claimed by executives. 
However, both scholars approach their analyses differently: Prakash remains true to 
an originalist approach whereas Azari draws on the methodology of American polit-
ical development (APD). 
Prakash provides the first comprehensive study of the original American pres-
idency. He skillfully authors a book for those interested in the executive branch and 
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for legal historians by drawing upon familiar and obscure sources to reconstruct the 
recognized powers and functions of the office. He provides an impressive overview 
of historical theories of presidential power and detailed accounts of how these theo-
ries informed constitutional debates during the founding period and the years that 
followed. His book provides a respectable alternative to the contention that the 
founders deserted any concept of monarchical power. In fact, through a careful and 
deliberate evaluation of the “common[,]” “familiar and longstanding narrative” Pra-
kash shows that those who claim the framers could not have created a robust execu-
tive is thus inherently wrong.2 To support this claim, Prakash presents an even-
handed analysis as he scrutinizes the structure of the executive branch (paying partic-
ular attention to whether the Constitution does in fact create a unitary executive), the 
president’s authority to execute the law, the president’s role in foreign affairs and as 
commander in chief, which extends to his authority during emergencies, and the pres-
ident’s overall interactions with the legislative branch, the courts, and of course, the 
states. Ultimately, he shows the Office of the President was monarchical from its 
inception.3 
Ultimately, Prakash’s book confirms Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal work, The Im-
perial Presidency.4 Schlesinger’s main argument is that while the “constitutional presi-
dency” is rooted in the Framers’ intent, it is the exodus from the founding princi-
ples—the power to initiate wars was granted to Congress, the executive’s role as 
commander-in-chief was to be read narrowly, and broad claims of executive privilege 
were ultimately foreign to the Constitution—that Schlesinger coins the term the “im-
perial presidency.”5 However, Prakash’s reading of the Framers of the Constitution 
is fundamentally at odds with Schlesinger’s notion of the “constitutional presidency.” 
Prakash’s central premise pivots on the following constitutional clause: “[t]he 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”6 
According to Prakash, these simple words essentially reallocated to the president an 
array of pseudo-monarchical powers. To understand this reordering and the effect of 
granting such grand authority to a single individual, Prakash argues that the solution 
is found in providing a broader understanding of the two words, “executive power.”7 
He adds that all supplementary texts involving the president and the Office of the 
President either illuminate or inhibit this orthodox understanding of unenumerated 
powers.8 
Additionally, Prakash notes that to further understand the scope of executive 
power we must include an analysis of both why particular words or phrases from 
Article II were excluded and the post-adoption practices of our first U.S. president, 
President Washington. For example, Prakash argues that the framers’ decision not to 
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incorporate the words “herein granted” in defining the powers of the president, as 
they had in Article I when outlining the powers of Congress, suggests that Article II 
confers to the president “general” unenumerated power that is limited only to specific 
qualifications. Thus, “Article II drew upon a tradition of conveying a general power 
and then qualifying it in various ways.”9 For some readers this is quite alarming par-
ticularly given the traditional reading of the pervasive Federalist guarantees that the 
powers of the intended national government were limited to only those enumerated 
in the Constitution. 
In tracing the origins of Article II, Prakash details both the legal traditions un-
derpinning each provision and what people of the time understood by those very 
provisions. Prakash asserts, as others have suggested, the founding fathers were af-
fected by the recent historical climate. As such, the English crown was a very likely 
source of influence. In fact, Prakash finds that contrary to popular belief individuals 
of the time spoke well of the English system.10 While acknowledging the Declaration 
of Independence and its response to kingly abuses weighed heavy on the minds of 
the framers, Prakash asserts, it was the ineptitude of the state governors that were of 
great concern.11 This ineffectiveness, Prakash notes, was due to state governors who 
faced term limits, “[encountered] structural features [that] ensured executive subser-
vience[,]” and the lack of the veto power.12 Despite concerns about excessive presi-
dential power or potential abuses, Prakash maintains the framers were in favor of a 
strong institution—a more robust executive than any that existed in America prior.13 
The imperial presidency is therefore not only in line with how the role of the presi-
dency was envisaged at the time of the founding, but also that the constitutional pres-
idency would “be more accountable and more capable of taking swift, energetic ac-
tion than any of the recent state or continental models.”14 
Building on an array of authoritative sources, Prakash illustrates that many 
Americans at the time of the founding regarded the Constitution as establishing an 
office similar to that of a monarchy. Even “clear-eyed foreigners”15 felt the same 
way. Additionally, Prakash recounts, delegates were confident in the shoo-in candi-
date, General George Washington, even referring to him as “His Excellency.”16 In 
fact, in Washington, Prakash argues, this is the closest the nation has ever come to 
having a King, and Washington’s practices—from overseeing the drafting of Article 
II to his role in the Whisky Rebellion—illuminate the earliest understandings of pres-
idential authority and have informed successive office holders.17 However, Prakash 
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reminds the reader, Washington himself assisted in limiting presidential power—
stepping down after two terms and launching the tradition of term limits.18 
Amassing an impressive defense, Prakash shows that while the ‘presidency’ by 
today’s standards does not invoke a monarch, a dictionary of the time did in fact 
define ‘monarch’ synonymously with ‘president.’ To press this point further, Prakash 
presents the reader with an extensive discussion of the nature of the presidency to 
demonstrate that the presidency was formally imperial, even monarchical.19 It is clear 
from Prakash’s account that the founding generation believed the presidency was to 
be monarchical, which is clearly at odds with popular wisdom. As a by-product of 
the analysis, the reader should conclude that what Prakash actually advances is the 
notion that the presidency is monarchical except where it is not. 
Even though Prakash’s argument is strong, there are some concerns. First, it 
was quite common for the founding generation to use “imperial” and “monarchy” as 
simply a label without the inference that Prakash attaches to these phrases. While this 
is raised in many of the sources Prakash utilizes as evidence of the nature of the 
presidency, he does not lend much weight to this point. In addition, as Prakash notes 
himself, Washington was emphatically opposed to a monarch.20 The Guarantee 
Clause appears to definitively abandon Prakash’s claim; it obliges the legislative body 
with the duty to “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment.”21 It therefore seems inconsistent for a document to include such a clause 
while at the same time instituting a monarchy at the federal level.  
Prakash’s primary work-around is to show simply that the designation of “re-
public” or “republican form of government” was inexact at the time of ratification.22 
He further points out that many republics had monarchical components, and in turn, 
many monarchies adopted features of republicanism. Given these mixed forms of 
governments of eighteenth century Europe, it is not incongruent for the framers to 
adopt something similar, Prakash contends. To further defend this assertion, Prakash 
notes that even in contemporary times, the Supreme Court has ruled the Guarantee 
Clause raises nonjusticiable political questions since the meaning of a republican form 
of government is not judicially discernible.23 While we might find that “there was an 
intermediate category of mixed monarchies”—republics also employed some of the 
powers exercised by monarchs—it is not so much the label we attach, but rather what 
powers are bestowed on the Office of the Presidency and by extension, on the indi-
vidual.24 To Prakash’s credit, the powers enjoyed by the president are examined in 
much of the book. 
To determine the scope of executive power, Prakash uses the interpretive 
method of originalism. For many scholars, this is controversial, but this methodolog-
ical approach endures in constitutional practice. Most, if not all, originalists would 
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contend that turning to public commentary to ascertain the meaning of a piece of 
constitutional text yields the most supportive proof of the original meaning of said 
text. Unfortunately, public commentary, particularly at the time of the founding, is 
often limited or entirely absent—critics have long asserted that textual meaning is 
thin when it concerns questions of executive power. As such, originalists will turn to 
obscure or less commonly accepted pieces of evidence, including the principles of 
legal theories or post-adoption practices and explanations. Such reliance leaves these 
kinds of studies open to critique. 
While this raises some concern to the validity of Prakash’s examination and the 
conclusions drawn, Prakash counters these accusations by arguing that the evidence 
of original intent is much thicker, which then allows him to competently draw con-
clusions about the true meaning of “executive power.” In fact, Prakash contends that 
the real problem, as he sees it, is that the originalist record is too voluminous.25 Even 
though Prakash believes that the true meaning of constitutional phrases lay with 
eighteenth-century practice, he does not limit his search to just distinguishing be-
tween historical patterns of practice of these words and phrases prior to their adop-
tion as legal texts, nor to the ratification period conceptions of the presidency. Rather, 
he utilizes any eighteenth century practice that he thinks inform original notions of 
executive power—for example, English common law and post-adoption commen-
tary and practices.26 While Prakash endeavors to present an all-inclusive analysis of 
constitutional text, one that recalls original notions of the constitutional president, a 
fuller discussion of the court’s role over developmental time, I would argue, is nec-
essary. While Prakash discusses a few notable instances of when the courts were in-
volved, it is rather limited in scope.27 
The holistic picture that Prakash attempts to convey to the reader misses an-
other key component. The founding generation’s understandings of federalism and 
the pivotal role federalism played in both the drafting and ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution is virtually non-existent in Prakash’s analysis. This theory informs the 
entire American Constitution, so it is remiss of Prakash when attempting to assemble 
a persuasive and credible account of the early understanding of national power—in 
this case, presidential—not to discuss the position of state’s powers. As a substitute, 
Prakash presents the reader with Hamilton’s account following the ratification of the 
Constitution: “[it] would not consist with the rules of sound construction to consider 
this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the more comprehen-
sive grant in the general clause [of Article II].”28 The concern is accounts, such as 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 7. 
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these, after the Constitution was adopted, may or may not actually mirror the con-
sensus prior to the text being adopted. For example, Hamilton himself appears to 
have switched positions. Prior to adoption, Hamilton seems to take a different posi-
tion on the theory of limited enumerated power. Hamilton’s Federalist Paper No. 32 
aligns with the promises made before ratification: “[t]he powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined” whereas “[t]hose 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”29 Exam-
ples such as this, demonstrate that even those who favored a strong federal govern-
ment maintained that the allocation of powers of the entire national government 
would be both “few” and “defined.” 
While the first few chapters discuss the presidency in broad terms, it is the con-
cluding chapters that are the book’s strength as they discuss a multitude of specific 
controversies relating to presidential power. His examination provides the reader 
with a sense that he carefully analyzed the merits of each case and relied on a variety 
of sources he deemed worthy of consideration. However, canvassing the number of 
controversies addressed in these chapters, it is impracticable for Prakash to devote 
more than a couple of pages on any of them. The conclusions are well drawn, but 
since they are presented so briefly, one might wonder if a fuller discussion was given 
would that yield a different conclusion. 
Imperial from the Beginning presents a noticeably contrary portrait of the presi-
dency. Most consider the contemporary executive to have far greater powers and in-
dependence in foreign and military affairs than in domestic issues, where Congress’s 
powers are considerable. Whereas the original presidency that Prakash reconstructs 
is an executive with vast powers in domestic affairs, but relatively little autonomy in 
foreign and military issues. This portrait challenges the work of John Yoo, who main-
tains that the Founding Fathers intentionally left the Constitution vague on the limits 
of executive authority. Turning to the presidency of Washington, for example, Yoo 
demonstrates the advantages to the nation of a strong executive.30 
The original understanding, according to Prakash, is that the commander-in-
chief was a widely used title at the time the Constitution was adopted. It referred to 
nothing more than the commander of a military unit.31 For Prakash, this designation 
simply positioned the individual in the chain of command; it granted no power to 
allow for any substantive decisions. The legislative body, on the other hand, was 
granted sweeping powers: the power to declare war; to formulate rules for the gov-
ernment; and to regulate the military, which also included the authority to dictate 
strategy. This view is in line with many scholars who have argued from this position, 
and thus, contradicts the use by today’s president who frequently relies on the com-
mander-in-chief clause to justify extensive unilateral military power.32  
                                                          
 29. Id; THE FEDERALIST PAPER No. 45, at 292 (James Madison). 
 30. JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO 
GEORGE W. BUSH (2009). 
 31. PRAKASH, supra note 2, at 142-43. 
 32. See Louis Fisher. “The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine.” 37 PRES. STUD. Q. 
(2007); DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY (1996).  
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Prakash insists that those powers granted to the president prevent him from 
deploying the military that would in any way intrude upon legislative authority. This 
includes deploying troops since it would represent a declaration of war. Of course, as 
Prakash notes, there are some exceptions where the deployment of troops would not 
constitute a declaration of war and would therefore grant to the executive the author-
ity to act without first obtaining legislative permission. The exceptions include repel-
ling sudden attacks, the rescuing of American citizens, and using offensive military 
troops against pirates since action taken against criminals does not constitute a dec-
laration of war. These are all instances that the Court has supported (i.e. Belmont 
(1937) and Prize Cases (1963))33 and pro-congressionalists would likely agree with 
such exceptions.34 
While there are many scholars who have asserted similar claims, there are many 
that will find Prakash’s commander-in-chief power contentious. Many of these schol-
ars, who are originalists, assert that the executive has largely unfettered authority 
when commanding the use of offensive military action. This group may even insist 
that Prakash’s brief overview cannot be taken as definitive or even persuasive, but 
given the detailed account by other scholars in conjunction with Prakash’s account, 
it is certainly persuasive and conclusive.35 However, taking Prakash’s commentary in 
this particular area one step further we might ask the following: does the power to 
repel invasions also include the authority to strike preemptively, as many have as-
serted? Moreover, does the executive have the constitutional authority, without prior 
congressional approval, to strike groups such as ISIL, if we label them as criminal 
organizations instead of conceptualizing them as states or even combatants? Prakash 
does not address these kinds of questions so the reader is left to consider them with-
out much direction from the author. What the author does note, however, is that 
even “[t]hough executive power brings to mind a set of connected concepts—se-
crecy, energy, vigilance [. . .] it is not a grant of absolute authority, allowing the pres-
ident to do whatever he thinks is best for the nation.”36 
There is much to admire about Imperial from the Beginning. It is very well written 
and provides a notable account of the framers’ understanding of the powers be-
stowed to the executive branch. Prakash insists that while the Constitution created a 
quasi-monarchical presidency, these powers were constrained by both the legislative 
and judicial branches. While a discussion of the powers of the original executive has 
obvious implications for current conflicts over presidential power, Prakash does not 
consider them. Rather his focus is entirely on the presidency in the founding period. 
However, using his analysis the astute reader can reconstruct contemporary debates 
about the executive’s constitutional powers and determine for themselves just how 
far that power should be extended. 
                                                          
 33. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
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 35. Id. 
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Azari, on the other hand, illustrates how executives define the terms of their 
elections through mandate rhetoric, which coexists alongside other partisan and ide-
ological narratives. Relying exclusively on presidential rhetoric Azari argues presi-
dents exploit mandate rhetoric to defend their decision-making to allies and critics 
alike, while at the same time establishing unrealistic expectations about the electoral 
pledges they will be able to accomplish. This book leaves the reader enthusiastically 
wondering where future executives will take their rhetorical leadership in an ever 
more splintered and polarized system. 
One of the strengths of Azari’s work is the methodological approach. Combin-
ing quantitative data with case studies allows Azari to analyze a broad array of trends 
while at the same time substantiating them in the details of certain presidencies. So 
as not to confuse the reader, Azari arranges the book systematically in order to ad-
dress both parts of the examination. Azari’s methodology utilizes comparative case 
studies, paying particular attention to key points in time in each presidency under 
examination. Delivering the People’s Message examines the presidencies of Herbert Hoo-
ver, (1928), Franklin D. Roosevelt (after 1932 and 1936), Dwight D. Eisenhower (af-
ter 1952 and 1956), Lyndon B. Johnson after 1964, Richard M. Nixon (after 1968 and 
1972), Ronald W. Reagan after 1980, George W. Bush after 2004, and finally Barack 
H. Obama after 2008. When read alongside previous studies by scholars, such as 
Patricia Conley, what we find is that presidential mandates are simply social construc-
tions.37 Azari’s book presents the reader with a fuller appreciation of both the practice 
and misuse of presidential mandates in U.S. politics. 
In Delivering the People’s Message, Azari points out that executives have long ap-
pealed to electoral mandates in order to rationalize the use of presidential power. 
Drawing on an original dataset of more than 1,500 presidential communications, in 
addition to primary documents collected from six presidential libraries, Azari me-
thodically scrutinizes the decisions made by presidents dating back to Hoover’s rhet-
oric in 1928—utilizing “specific provisions in the platform that [was believed to have] 
been important”38 versus later presidents that “approached the subject with varying 
degrees of abstraction.”39 Azari contends that Reagan’s election in 1980 exhibits a 
clear shift from the modern presidency fashioned by FDR to what she distinguishes 
as a more partisan period for the executive branch. This partisan model, according to 
Azari, is a type of governance where the executive seems to have need of a popular 
mandate in order to control recalcitrant and extremely divergent elements within his 
own party as well as being able to prosper when facing steadfast opposition from the 
opposing party. 
Conventional wisdom asserts that wide electoral margins yield presidential man-
dates. Azari shelves this convention and examines the assorted ways in which execu-
tives have exploited the very language of mandates to promote their policy agenda. 
                                                          
 37. PATRICIA H. CONLEY, PRESIDENTIAL MANDATES: HOW ELECTIONS SHAPE THE NATIONAL AGENDA 
(2001).  
 38. AZARI, supra note 1, at 42. 
 39. Id.  
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Azari asserts that the political and policy dimensions of the presidency are inextrica-
bly related. Said another way, Azari discovers that when the presidency enjoys high 
public esteem and party polarization is low, mandate rhetoric is less frequent and 
employs broad themes. By contrast, presidents turn to mandate rhetoric when the 
office loses legitimacy, as in the wake of Watergate, Vietnam, and during periods of 
intense polarization. In more recent times, Azari contends, while these two features 
are more visible they have also converged. In fact, Azari finds, by the time Obama 
was elected, these elements combined, which resulted in an increase in the use of 
mandate language and the unworkable hopes that frequently comes with exalted 
promises.40 
Azari adheres to APD, but rather than accept the standard APD claim that 
executives search for affirmation for their governance in terms of them backing or 
resisting the current ideological regime, she contends that presidents assert rhetorical 
mandates in order to validate their dubious or opposed uses of power. As Azari elu-
cidates, much of our past reveals that the role of the presidency has far surpassed any 
of our expectations about how far reaching executive authority may legitimately ex-
tend, which has at times led to wide-ranging disagreements “with other branches of 
government and accusations of ‘tyrannical’ behavior.”41 This explains, according to 
Azari, why Andrew Jackson defended his bank veto in the name of the people. 
Delivering the People’s Message is an original and proficient take on Stephen Skow-
ronek’s claims that executive power dwells not only in the process of achievement, 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, in successfully managing the very definition 
of those triumphs. Azari, on the other hand, presses the reader to ponder how a 
president’s mandate rhetoric delineates his role in the political process. For example, 
Azari notes that the employment of campaign pledges, as a noteworthy rhetorical 
figure of speech in the late modern era, was not only a bid to attain deliberate political 
ends, but it also linked the executive’s standing as a representative by involuntarily 
typecasting the executive as a delegate instead of as a trustee.42 
Azari suggests that mandates are the result of rhetorical choice: when executives 
appeal to a mandate, they rhetorically leverage their (re)election for calculated ends. 
This kind of argument is well-known to those acquainted with the seminal works in 
presidential leadership, such as Jeffrey Tulis’ The Rhetorical Presidency,43 Samuel Ker-
nell’s Going Public,44 Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power,45 and of course, Skow-
ronek’s the Politics Presidents Make.46 In fact, Azari artfully weaves her analysis into this 
prevailing scholarship, as her book concerns vicissitudes to executive leadership and 
power, and cuts across both chronological and political time. But, in her own words, 
                                                          
 40.  See generally id. at 135-65. 
 41.  Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 119-20. 
 43. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987). 
 44. SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (1986). 
 45. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF 
LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990).  
 46. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE 
BUSH (1993). 
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an executive’s understanding of mandates is shaped both by political context and by 
how an executive comprehends the structure of the office and the role of the presi-
dency in the political system.47 
Azari previews her argument in chapter one, and supplies a broad glimpse of 
mandate rhetoric from the presidencies of Hoover through to Obama. She uses de-
scriptive statistics to show that mandate claims were not a prominent feature of pres-
idential rhetoric, but that since the Nixon presidency, “mandate rhetoric has become 
a regular fixture of presidential discourse.”48 Azari argues that this pattern cannot be 
understood by studying the popular vote or the vote margin with the Electoral Col-
lege in any election, and the president’s approval ratings cannot provide us with an-
swers either.49 Instead we must turn to the extent of party polarization in the legisla-
tive branch.50 Consequently, Azari’s data exposes four mandate epochs each with a 
well-defined set of rhetorical characteristics. The four eras are 1929-1938, 1939-1968, 
1969-1980, and finally 1980-present. Azari finds that mandate rhetoric declined in 
number between the Progressive and modern periods before increasing in the late 
modern and what she classifies as the partisan era. This latest development of man-
date rhetoric, Azari asserts, is ascribed to the dwindling status of the executive branch 
and also the polarization of the party system following the Watergate scandal.51 
Chapters two through five are each reserved to one of the four periods (as noted 
above). Azari develops her theory and insight in each chapter by examining a series 
of case studies. Each of the case studies under review carefully evaluates party poli-
tics, the policies (those that were instituted and the ones that were not), and the per-
sonalities of the office holder to demonstrate the stability of mandate rhetoric in that 
particular period. This systematic analysis illustrates how mandate rhetoric over time 
has been transformed. For example, we see how the scope of rhetoric changed from 
policy specific to generality, how representation style shifted between delegate and 
trustee, and how rhetoric is tailored to target a specific audience (a congressional 
message looks quite different to a national speech or even a private audience). Azari’s 
carefully crafted examination of these elements advances a robust study of wide-rang-
ing executive rhetoric. 
To further advance her theory, Azari also relies on archival documents and 
press responses to establish the prevalent response to both the election returns and 
to the way in which executive’s employ mandate rhetoric. Azari explicitly notes that 
while these assertions “can only infer strategy and motivation,”52 she still offers them 
as support for broader declarations. This is where her analysis is on thin ground. 
Scholars of rhetoric must be vigilant when contextualizing and proclaiming the im-
portance of its intent or impact. For example, while Azari shows that internal memos 
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reveal Eisenhower’s communications advisors were attentive to “whether to empha-
size party or nation,”53 Azari goes on to suggest that these same memos illustrate 
Eisenhower’s “philosophy [and that] of the office.”54 These kinds of communications 
aid in the construction of Eisenhower’s rhetoric, but it is more difficult to convince 
the astute reader that they also echo his point of view, particularly when we know 
that Eisenhower did not always take his own advice. 
In chapter two, Azari depicts FDR as a transitional figure, which should not 
come as any real surprise for the reader. For Azari, FDR is transitional, because “[he] 
neither embraced Wilson’s vision of the party mandate, nor did he use mandate logic 
frequently when promoting New deal policies.”55 However, after 1936, FDR “paral-
lel[ed] . . . Andrew Jackson and the Second Bank” because, as Azari notes, FDR “de-
fended his legitimacy by claiming a mandate”—attributable to the election land-
slide—“for his actions, drawing on his connection to the people and his fulfillment 
of campaign promises” to justify his “court-packing” assault on the Supreme Court.56 
It might initially appear that Azari is contradicting herself because, on the one hand, 
Azari asserts FDR is transitional because he abandons Wilson’s vision, but is also 
transitional because FDR appears to parallel Jackson’s use of mandates: “the mandate 
was not simply about policy positions but also about elections as the basis of presi-
dential authority.”57 However, the reader should bear in mind Azari’s claim in this 
chapter: “[p]residential strength in the modern era, it seemed, emanated from an abil-
ity to both fulfill and temper the demands of the office.”58 
In chapter three, Azari focuses on the “modern period” of both Eisenhower 
and Johnson. Azari claims that “the modern period is most readily defined by what 
was absent: party polarization and distrust of government[,]” which allowed these 
kinds of presidents to make broad appeals to the electorate.59 Eisenhower and John-
son belong in this typology, Azari notes, since they avoided any claim of presidential 
mandates even though they both had clear electoral wins: “[n]either Eisenhower nor 
Johnson appear to have seen mandate rhetoric as a useful tool in dealing with high 
expectations. . . both remain[ed] above party politics.”60 
In Azari’s retelling, Johnson rhetorically forsook partisan politics, insisting that 
his victory “had been due to a ‘strong and broad consensus’ and that he interpreted 
the election as a ‘mandate . . . for responsible, constructive, and progressive programs 
to meet the problems of American’s agenda.’”61 Azari notes that Johnson’s rhetorical 
choice resulted in policies that, once instituted, “changed the political conversation 
and invited a conservative backlash about race, culture, and the role of government 
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that still shapes politics nearly fifty years later.”62 One concern for the reader through-
out the book is whether the author inflates the significance of rhetoric. In this partic-
ular case, Azari shows that “Johnson and his political team saw the election result as 
a source of political leverage that could help them achieve their goals”63—rhetoric 
was thus regarded in instrumental terms and “not the provenance of the goals them-
selves.”64 So, while Azari wonders whether another mandate story could have af-
fected the outcome, it appears that either of the mandate narratives would have had 
the same result since Johnson was ultimately appealing to unity. 
The kind of national unity and consensus-building that Johnson appeared to 
enjoy did not manifest in the presidencies of Nixon or Jimmy Carter. As Azari illus-
trates in chapter four, both Nixon and Carter “experienced the frustrations of a pow-
erful but increasingly distrusted office and leaned on mandate rhetoric as a means of 
conveying legitimacy to the public as well as within the executive branch.”65 Nixon 
broke new ground by manipulating his mandate rhetoric and “remaking the presi-
dency as representative of a party constituency first and as a national leader second.”66 
Carter, on the other hand, attempted to create distance between the presidency and 
partisan politics in an effort to appeal to the electorate.67 
Chapter five and the concluding chapter both focus on the partisan divide that 
for so many reasons agitates national politics. In chapter five, Azari first identifies 
and then explores what was distinctive behavior for Nixon’s presidency in actuality 
became the norm for the presidencies of Bush II and Obama.68 The age of mandates 
is mostly credited to divided-government and polarized partisanship, which often 
presents a crisis of legitimacy for these executives and their respective governing 
strategy.69 As Azari explains: “[d]eepening divisions between the two parties have 
inspired presidents to direct their mandate rhetoric at their supporters, claiming man-
dates for party agenda items.”70 
Among the normative themes surveyed in the concluding chapter, it includes 
how presidential leadership has changed “from a trusteeship model toward a dele-
gate-style approach to representation,” 71 to whether or not the president is a nonpar-
tisan representative of the national interest—an ideal that FDR, Eisenhower, and 
Johnson attempted to accomplish—and if the executive is a partisan advocate of nar-
row mandates—instituted by Nixon which has only escalated over time. In addition, 
while Azari addresses, albeit briefly, transparency, accountability, and even oversight 
when we think in terms of the unilateral president, she provides no real prescriptions 
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for reigning in presidential prerogatives. She simply notes, “[t]he use of mandate rhet-
oric has not alleviated these problems; it may even have exacerbated them.”72 While 
Azari provides no solutions, this book should be required reading for students of 
political thought, politics and history devotees, Congress and of course, presidency 
scholars. 
Imperial from the Beginning and Delivering the People’s Message presents a catalog of 
controversies regarding presidential power. Both Prakash and Azari collect a remark-
able array of sources, and both impressively utilize their data to advance two nuanced 
theories that add to the current literature. For these reasons, both of these studies 
should be an important resource for anyone interested in presidential powers. Any-
one looking for resolution to contemporary controversies involving assertions of 
presidential power, however, must go beyond both Prakash and Azari’s studies; they 
will not necessarily find answers simply by turning to the founding presidency nor in 
how presidential mandates have changed over time. 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 173. 
13
Fletcher: Executive Power: The Springs of Authority and Mandate Rhetoric
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
